The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods. In contrast to the compulsory public goods game, optional participation provides a natural way to avoid deadlocks in the state of mutual defection. The three resulting strategiesFcollaboration or defection in the public goods game, as well as not joining at allFare studied by means of a replicator dynamics, which can be completely analysed in spite of the fact that the payoff terms are nonlinear. If cooperation is valuable enough, the dynamics exhibits a rock-scissors-paper type of cycling between the three strategies, leading to sizeable average levels of cooperation in the population. Thus, voluntary participation makes cooperation feasible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game. r
Introduction
Most theories on the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals are based on kin selection (Hamilton, 1963) , group selection (Wilson & Sober, 1994) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) . In all three models, cooperative behavior is attained through basic mechanisms of discrimination enabling individuals to target their altruistic acts towards certain partners only.
In this article, we present another mechanism to achieve sizeable levels of cooperation in a population. The following investigation is based on the public goods game (see Fehr & G. achter, 2002; Kagel & Roth, 1995) which represents a natural extension of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players (see Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Dawes, 1980; Hauert & Schuster, 1997) .
In a typical public goods game, an experimenter gives 20 dollars to each of eight players. The players may contribute part or all of their money to some common pool. The experimenter then triples this amount and divides it equally among the eight players, irrespective of the amount of their individual contribution. If all players contribute maximally, they will end up with 60 dollars each. But each individual is faced with the temptation to exploit, as a free rider, the contributions of the co-players. Hence, the dominating strategy is to invest nothing at all. If all players do this, they will not increase their initial capital. In this sense, the ''rational'' equilibrium solution prescribed to ''homo oeconomicus'' leads to economic stalemate. In actual experiments, players tend to invest a lot, however: typically, in the first round, they invest 10 dollars or more (Fehr & G. achter, 2002) .
Public goods games are abundant in human and animal societies, and can be seen as basic examples of economic interactions (see e.g. Binmore, 1994; Dugatkin, 1997) .
The Model
We consider a large population of players. From time to time, N such players are chosen randomly. Within such a group, players can either contribute some fixed amount c or nothing at all. The return of the public good, i.e. the payoff to the players in the group, depends on the abundance of cooperators. If n c denotes their number among the public goods players, the net payoff for cooperators P c and defectors P d is given by P c ¼ Àc þ rc n c N ;
where r denotes the interest rate on the common pool. For a public goods game deserving its name, we must have
The first inequality states that if all do the same, they are better off cooperating than defecting; the second inequality states that each individual is better off defecting than cooperating. Selfish players will therefore always avoid the cost of cooperation c; i.e. a collective of selfish players will never cooperate. Defection is the dominating strategy. Hence both classical and evolutionary game theory predict that all players will defect, and obtain zero payoff. We now extend the public goods game. In this optional public goods game, players can decide whether to participate in the public goods game or not. [For a similar approach in the prisoner's dilemma see Batali & Kitcher (1995) ; Orbell & Dawes (1993) ]. Individuals unwilling to join the public goods game are termed loners. These players prefer to rely on a small but fixed payoff P l ¼ sc with
such that the members in a group where all cooperate are better off than loners, but loners are better off than members in a group of defectors. For the optional public goods game, there are thus three behavioral types in the population: (a) the loners unwilling to join the public goods game, (b) the cooperators ready to join the group and to contribute their effort, and (c) the defectors who join, but do not contribute. Assuming that groups form randomly, the payoffs for the different strategies P c ; P d and P l are then determined by the relative frequencies x; y and z of the three strategies.
The Equations of Motion
Evolutionary game theory assumes that a strategy's payoff determines the growth rate of its frequency within the population. More precisely, following (Weibull (1995) , Schlag (1998) and Hofbauer & Sigmund (1998) , we postulate in our model that players using strategies i ¼ 1; y; n occasionally compare their payoff with that of a randomly chosen ''model'' member of the population, and adopt the strategy of their model with a probability proportional to the difference between the model's payoff and their own, if this is positive (and with probability 0 otherwise). In the continuous time model, the evolution of the frequencies x i of the strategies i is given by
with 1pi; jpn; which reduces to the replicator equation
where % P ¼ P x j P j is the average payoff in the population.
To be precise, we consider a very large, wellmixed population with three types of players: loners, cooperators and defectors. From time to time, sample groups of N players are randomly chosen and offered to participate in a single public goods game. Note that in large populations, the probability that two players ever encounter again can be neglected. Depending on their type, players either refuse to participate or join the public goods game. In the latter case, they either defect, or cooperate. But, their strategies are specified beforehand, and do not depend on the composition of the sampled group. In particular, we do not consider conditional strategies of the type: cooperate if and only if the group contains more than two cooperators, or the like.
Each player is sampled a number of times, and obtains an average payoff which depends on his strategy as well as the composition of the entire population. This composition changes according to the replicator dynamics [see eqns (3) and (4)]. The intuition behind the dynamics is that occasionallyFand independently of the sampling of the public goods teamsFa randomly chosen player A compares his or her payoff with that of another player B (also randomly chosen, within the entire population and not limited to the ''public goods'' groups to which A belonged), and adopts the strategy of B; if it yields a higher payoff, with a probability proportional to the difference in their payoffs. Opportunities for updating, i.e. changing the strategy, are supposed to occur much less frequently than opportunities to play in a public goods group. We emphasize that there are other reasonable game dynamics, but for the replicator equation we can produce a full analysis.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we set the cost c of cooperation equal to 1: The payoff for loners is then given by the constant
In order to compute the payoff values for cooperators and defectors, we first derive the probability that S of the N sampled individuals are actually willing to join the public goods game. In the case S ¼ 1 (no co-player shows up) we assume that the player has no other option than to play as a loner, and obtains payoff s: This happens with probability z NÀ1 : For a given player willing to join the public goods game, the probability of finding, among the N À 1 other players in the sample, S À 1 co-players joining the group (S41), is
The probability that m of these players are cooperators, and S À 1 À m defectors, is
In that case, the payoff for defectors is rm=S: Hence the expected payoff for a defector in a group of S players (S ¼ 2; y; N) is
Thus,
OPTIONAL PUBLIC GOOD GAMES In a group with S À 1 co-players playing the public goods game, switching from cooperation to defection yields 1 À r=S: Hence,
Using the same arguments as before, we obtain
The advantage of defectors over cooperators depends only on the fraction of individuals actually willing to play, i.e. on the fraction of loners z: At the same time, it is independent of the loner's payoff s:
The sign of P d À P c in fact determines whether it pays to switch from cooperation to defection or vice versa, FðzÞ ¼ 0 being the equilibrium condition. We claim that for rp2; F has no root, and for r42 exactly one root # z in the interval ð0; 1Þ: In order to show this, we consider the function GðzÞ ¼ F ðzÞð1 À zÞ which has the same roots as F ðzÞ in ð0; 1Þ and note that (a) Gð0Þ ¼ 1 À r=N40; (b) Gð1Þ ¼ 0; (c) GðzÞ^ð2 À rÞ ðN À 1Þð1 À zÞ 2 for z-1; such that in a neighborhood of z ¼ 1 GðzÞ is negative for r42; and (d) G 00 ðzÞ ¼ z NÀ3 ðN À 1ÞððN À 2Þðr À 1Þ À zðNrÀ N À rÞÞ changes sign at most once in ð0; 1Þ: Thus, for r42 [which by eqn (1) implies N42] there exists a threshold value of the loners frequency # z above which cooperators fare better than defectors (see Fig. 1 ).
The average population payoff % P can now be rewritten using the condition y ¼ 1 À x À z:
Substituting eqns (5) and (6) then yields
The Dynamics
Let us now analyse the replicator dynamics. The corners of the simplex S 3 ¼ fðx; y; zÞ :
x; y; zX0; x þ y þ z ¼ 1g; i.e. the vectors e i of the standard basis (i ¼ c; d; l in a straightforward notation), are obviously fixed points. There are no other fixed points on the boundary of S 3 : In fact, the edge e c e d consists of an orbit leading from e c (cooperators only) to e d (defectors only), the edge e d e l is an orbit leading to the state consisting of loners only, and the orbit e l e c closes this heteroclinic cycle of rock-scissors-paper type on the boundary.
In order to analyse the dynamics in the interior, it is useful to show that the replicator equation, defined on the simplex S 3 ; can be rewritten in the form of a Hamiltonian system, and thus admits an invariant of motion. Indeed, defining as a new variable f ¼ x=ðx þ yÞ; i.e. the fraction of cooperators among the individuals actually participating in the public goods game, we obtain
This, as well as substituting eqn (7) into the replicator equation ' z ¼ zðs À % PÞ; yields The difference between the payoff of cooperators P c and defectors P d is a function of the fraction of loners z: F ðzÞ ¼ P d À P c : If almost everybody is participating in the public goods game (z-0) then F ðzÞ40 holds and it pays to defect. However, for interest rates r42; if the proportion z of loners increases, it eventually pays to cooperate (F ðzÞo0) and the social dilemma disappearsFat least for a while. F ðzÞ has either no or a unique root in the interval ð0; 1Þ: with ðf ; zÞ on the unit square ð0; 1Þ 2 : Dividing the right-hand side by the function f ð1 À f Þz ð1 À zÞð1 À z NÀ1 Þ; which is positive on the unit square, corresponds to a change in velocity which does not affect the orbits. This yields
where GðzÞ and Lð f Þ are primitives of gðzÞ and lð f Þ:
with RðzÞ bounded on ½0; 1; we obtain the Hamiltonian system
The actual dynamics of the system depends on whether the condition P d ¼ P c can be satisfied in the interior S 3 ; and hence on the interest rate r: For rp2 there are no fixed points except the corners and all trajectories in int S 3 are homoclinic orbits of e l : Thus, the system will display intermittently brief bursts of cooperation, but always ends up with no one willing to participate in the public goods game, as shown in Fig. 2 . For r42; eqn (2) implies that there exists a unique fixed point Q ¼ ð # x; # y; # zÞ in int S 3 such that F ð# zÞ ¼ 0 and:
as well as
which follows from P d ¼ P l : Due to the fact that the system is conservative, and the Hamiltonian H attains a strict (global) maximum at ðs= ðr À 1Þ; # zÞ; the interior equilibrium Q is a center, i.e. it is neutrally stable and surrounded by closed orbits (see Fig 3) . Actually, all interior orbits are closed: eqn (10) shows that GðzÞ-ÀN for z-0; 1 if 2oroN; and eqn (11) implies that Lðf Þ-À N as f -0; 1 if sor À 1: Therefore, H-À N uniformly near the boundary of ½0; 1 2 and hence all level sets of H are closed curves. In particular, no interior orbit converges to the non-hyperbolic equilibrium e l :
Variations of the three parameters N; r; s allow to position Q anywhere in the interior of the simplex (see Fig. 4 ). Note that in general all three parameters must be adjusted to place Q in a particular location. According to eqns (12) and (13), the fixed point Q lies on the line
independent of the group size N: For increasing N; Q moves towards the corner e l and in the e l e d c Fig. 2 . The three corners e c ; e d ; e l of S 3 are saddle points (but e l is not hyperbolic) and the boundary bd S 3 represents a rock-scissors-paper type heteroclinic cycle. For small interest rates, ro2; no fixed point exists in int S 3 and all orbits converge to e l : But e l is not Lyapunov stable. Parameters: N ¼ 5; r ¼ 1:8; s ¼ 0:5: OPTIONAL PUBLIC GOOD GAMES 191 limit N-N homoclinic orbits issuing from and leading to e l are obtained.
For the limiting cases r ¼ N; s ¼ r À 1 and s ¼ 0; Q approaches the edges e c e d ; e l e c or e l e d ; respectively. In particular, for r ¼ N; cooperation becomes stable in the sense that, while the state can fluctuate along the edge z ¼ 0 by random drift, any small fluctuation introducing the missing loners will be offset in such a way that the loners vanish again and the number of cooperators is larger than previously (see Fig. 5 ).
Although the time averages of the state variables over an orbit of period T; defined as % v ¼ ð1=TÞ R T 0 v dt; depend on the initial conditions, the following relations hold for every orbit. First, the average fraction of cooperators among playing individuals corresponds to its value at the equilibrium point Q:
This means that the time average lies on the solid line in Fig. 4 which connects Q and e l : Second, the average of the fraction of cooperators among participants in public goods games %
